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BANKRUPTCY-SURETY ON ATTACHMENT BOND CONDITIONED UPON FINAL.JuDG-
mENT NOT RELAsED By PRiNCIPAL's BANxRUPTCY.-The defendant became surety
on a bond given to release an attachment of the principal's property and condi-
tioned upon final judgment The principal was declared bankrupt within four
months of the attachment and the final judgment entered against him remained
unsatisfied. The defendant pleaded the bankruptcy adjudication as a defense to
a suit on the bond. Held, that the surety was not released. Andrews v. Jones
(1924, P I.) 125 At. 356; Andrews v. Fain (1924, R. I.) 125 At. 357.
Two types of suretyship bond may'be given to release property attached as
security pending suit: one, a forthcoming bond conditioned to restore the specific
property levied on or to pay the value thereof ; the other, a bond conditioned upon
final judgment, entry of judgment making the surety's obligation absolute. See
Shumack v, Art Metal Co. (1911) 84 Conn. 331, 336, 8o At. 290, 293; Spencer,
Suretyship (1913) sec. 282, 283. U. S. Comp. Sts. i916, sec. 9651 (f) dissolves
all attachment liens obtained against an insolvent person Within four months prior
to the debtor's petition in bankruptcy but does not affect the judgment Metcalf
v. Barker (igo2) 187 U. S. I65, 174, 23 Sup. Ct. 67, 71; Guaranty Security Co. v.
Oppenheimer (1923) 243 Mass. 324, 137 N. E. 644. So a surety on a bond con-
ditioned to restore the attached property is discharged by his principal's bank-
ruptcy within four months of the attachment, since the bankruptcy destroys the
surety's privilege of extinguishing his duty by having the released property returned
to the creditor. Wise Coal Co. v. Columbia Zinc & Lead Co. (1911) 157 Mo.
App. 315, 138 S. W. 67; Casady v. Hartzell (i915) 171 Iowa, 325, 151 N. W. 97.
And as the bankruptcy of the principal does not take away any similar privilege
from the surety on a bond conditioned upon final judgment, such a surety is not
discharged. Pope v. Title G. & S. Co. (913) 152 Wis. 6II, i4o N. W. 348;
Marks v. Outlet Clothing Co. (ig93) i22 Me. 448, z2o Atl. 427; I Collier,
Bankruptcy (13th ed. 1923) 587. Due to the similarity of purpose of the two
types of bond, i. e. to release the attachment, some courts have confused the results
flowing from each and have discharged the surety regardless of the condition'in
the bond. Muhlhauser Brewing. Co. v. Simms (ig1) 129 La. I34, 55 So. 739;
Crook-Homer Co. v. Gilpin (19io) 112 Md. i, 75 Atl. io49; COMMENTS (1917)
5 CALI. L. REv. 335. The instant case is apparently sound in giving a different
legal effect to the differing intentions of the obligee as expressed in the terms of the
bond. See Glenn, Surety's Right to Indemnity (1922) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL,
582, at pp. 596, 597.
BANKS AND BANAINa-ColuEcTioN-RsoNsmrryrr FOR NEGLIGENCE OF SuB-
AGENT.-The plaintiff deposited in a local bank an out-of-town check which was
duly sent to the defendant bank for collection. Through the defendant's negligence
the collection was not made before the drawee bank failed. The plaintiff sued
the defendant for negligence. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. City of
Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (1924, W. D. Tex.) 3oo Fed. 573.
When a bank has undertaken to collect a negotiable instrument for another bank
and negligently fails to collect, under the Massachusetts rule it alone is responsible
to the depositor. Dorchester Bank v. New England Bank (1848, Mass.) I Cush.
177; Lord v. Hingham Nat. Bank (19o4) 186 Mass. 161, 71 N. E. 312; COMMENT
(1924) 12 CALIF. L. Rav. 2o9. Under the New York rule the bank of deposit is
alone responsible to him. Revere Bank v. Bank of Republic (I9o2) 172 N. Y.
1o2, 64 N. E. 799. And each sub-agent is responsible only to its immediate
principal. Gilpin v. Columbia Nat. Bank (i917) 22o N. Y. 406, 115 N. E. 982.
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A few isolated decisions let the depositor hold either the agent or the sub-agent.
Bank of Lindsborg v, Ober (1884) 31 Kan. 599, 3 Pac. 324. Either rule may be
varied by special agreement or statute. First Nat. Bank v. Butler (1885) 41 Ohio
St. 519; Fed. Reserve Bank v. Malloy (1924) 264 U. S. 16o, 44 Sup. Ct 296. 
The
United States Supreme Court has adopted the New York rule. Exchange Nat.
Bank v. Third Nat. Bank (1884) 112 U. S. 276, 5 Sup. Ct. 141. The lower federal
courts, as in the instant case, follow this decision regardless of the rule applied
by the state where the contract was made. Taylor v. Nat. Bank (1919, N. D.
Ohio) 262 Fed. i68.
CARRIERs-WHo ARE PASSENGERS-WHEN RELATION ExIsTs.-The plaintiff, a
passenger on a street car, got off at the request of the conductor to inspect the
damage to the car from a collision. While on the street, he was injured by 
an
automobile. The lower court refused to charge that the plaintiff was a passenger.
From a judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed. Held, that the 
instruc-
tion should have been given. Moffet v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co. (1924, Mich.) 
200
N. W. 274.
Because of the high degree of care owed by a carrier to its passengers, the
moment of the creation and termination of the status is vital. See (1923) 32
YALE LAW JouRNAT, 841. As regards railways, the relation begins as soon as one
intending in good faith to become a passenger enters upon the carrier's premises
to engage passage, and that relation continues until arrival at the place of destina-
tion and a reasonable time to alight and leave the carrier's premises has 
elapsed.
Powell v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. (i9o8) =o Pa. 638, 7o Atl. 268.
Similarly, with respect to steamboats. Hrebrik v. Carr (1886, E. D. N. Y.) 
29
Fed. 298. But since one usually boards and alights from street cars in public
streets, there is here less uniformity as to the origin and termination of the rela-
tion. It is generally held that one becomes a passenger of a street car when 
the
motorman checks the car in response to a signal. Karr v. Milwaukee Heat, L. 
&
T. Co. (1907) 132 Wis. 662, 113 N. W. 62; see (igo6) i HAv. L.,REv. 250.
But some courts have held that the relationship does not begin until the person
reaches the vehicle. Donovan v. Hartford Street Ry. Co. (1894) 65 Conn. 2oI,
32 Atl. 35o. The carrier-passenger relation continues while transferring 
from one
car to another. Pins v. Conn. Co. (1917) 92 Conn. 310, 1o2 AUt. 595; Feldnmn v.
Chicago Rys. Co. (1919) 289 II. 25, 124 N. E. 334; see (i92o) 18 Micir. L. REv.
231; contra: Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Dressier (1922) 132 Va. 342, 111 S. E.
243. But where the destination has been reached, the relation ceases as soon 
as
one has alighted. Creamer v. West End St. Ry. Co. (1892) 156 Mass. 32o, 31
N. E. 391. There is considerable authority, however, that the relation continues
for a reasonable time after alighting until a place of safety is reached. Melton v.
Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. (19o7) 153 Ala. 95, 45 So. 15I; see (1924)
37 HARV. L. RFv. 4g7. Where, however, a person alights temporarily for 
a
purpose other than that of transportation, the determinant factor has been said to
be the propriety of the purpose. But the exact content of the term "proper
purpose" is vague. The submission of a dispute over a fare to an inspector was
held to be a proper purpose. Seidman. v. N. Y. Rys. Co. (1914, Sup. Ct. App. T.)
88 Misc. 53, 15o N. Y. Supp. 578. But otherwise, where one alighted to pacify 
the
conductor and a third person. Zeccardi v. Yonkers R. Co. (1907) 19o N. Y. 389,
83 N. E. 31. Where one was procuring change to pay a carrier, he was held to be
a passenger. Fornwff v. Columbia Taxicab Co. (1913) 179 Mo. App. 620, 162
S. W. 699 (taxi). And so, where help was being offered to the carrier. Stuchly
v. Chicago City Ry. Co. (1913) 182 Ill. App. 337 (removing wagon from tracks);
Street Ry. Co. v. Bolton (1885) 43 Ohio St. 224, I N. E. 333 (pushing car). In
these border-line cases, where the person is not actually being transported, the
courts seem astute to find the relation.
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CONSTITTIONA. LAw-ALIENS-ANTI-ALIEN LEGISLATION WITHIN POLICE
PowI.-The petitioner was convicted for the violation of a statute which pro-
vided that "no unnaturalized foreign-born person . . . . shall own or have in his
possession . . . . any pistol, revolver or other firearm capable of being concealed
on the person." Calif. Sts. 1923, ch. 339, sec. 2. The statute was attacked as
violating the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal
Constitution and'a writ of habeas corpus was" issued.. Held, that the writ be dis-
charged. Ex parte Rameria (1924, Calif.) 226 Pac. 914.
Various discriminations against aliens have been upheld as a valid exercise of
the police power. Heim v. McCall (1915) 239 U. S. 175, 36 Sup. Ct. 78 (employ-
ment in public works) ; Patstone v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (1914) 232
U. S. 138, 34 Sup. Ct 281 (hunting); Trageser v. Gray (1890) 73 Md. 250, 20
AtL 905 (licenses to sell liquor) ; State v. Rheaume (1922) 8o N. H. 319, 116
At. 758 (use and possession of firearms) ; Commonwealth v. Hana (19o7) 195
Mass. 262, 81 N. E. 149 (peddler's license). See COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 299; (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 388. Since the war there seems to
be a tendency to tolerate discriminatory restrictions upon aliens.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER-PoWER OF APPRO-
PRIATIoN.-A statute authorized, in cases of emergency, annual appropriations from
any unappropriated funds in the state treasury, to meet operating expenses of any
state institution, upon the certification of the governor, secretary of state, and
treasurer that such moneys were needed to carry on the regular work of the
institution. Wis. Sts. 1921, clh. 3, see. 2o.74. The secretary of state refused his
certification of a certain appropriation made by authority of this statute, on the
ground that the statute itself was unconstitutional as amounting to a delegation of
the legislative power to appropriate public money. The relator sought a writ of
mandamus to compel the secretary of state to make the proper certification. Held,
(one judge dissenting) that the statute was constitutional, and that since the
approval of only a majority of the three executive officials was necessary to make
an appropriation, the writ be denied. State, ex reL. Board of Regents of Normal
Schools, v. Zimmerman (1924, Wis.) 197 N. W. 823.
It is generally stated that legislative power may not be delegated to a non-legis-
lative body. Field v. Clark (1892) 14,3 U. S. 649, 694, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 504;
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed. 1903) 163. But efficiency in modern
government often requires that the formulation of rules and regulations for the
enforcement of general laws of the legislature be left to administrative bodies.
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Dey (-1888, C. C. S. D. Iowa) 35 Fed. 866; United
States v. Grinuaud (191o) 220 U. S. 5o6, 3I Sup. Ct. 480; Foster, Tle Delegation
of Legislative Power to Administrative Officers (1913) 7 111- L. R~v. 397-413.
Naturally, the difficult question arises as to the line of distinction between legisla-
tive and administrative functions. Wayman v. Southard (1825, U. S.) io Wheat.
42; Commonwealth v. Sissons (1905) 189 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 61g; United States
v. Grimaud, supra. The power to make appropriations from public funds has
been considered as purely a legislative function. State v. Burdick (1893) 4 Wyo.
272, 33 Pac. 125; State v. Moore (1896) 50 Nebr. 88, 94, 69 N. W. 373, 375. And
also as analogous to the power of taxation, the two being inseparably connected.
Agricultural & Mechanical College v. Hager (igo5) 121 Ky. I, 14, 87 S. W. 1125;
Gem Irrigation Dist. v. Van Deusen (1918) 31 Idaho, 779,; 176 Pac. 887; I Cooley,
Taxation (4 th ed. 1924) sec. 177. The power of taxation is one of the most
jealously guarded of legislative powers and rarely delegated. Houghton v. Austin
(1874) 47 Calif. 646; Inhabitants of Town of Bernard v. Allen (1898) 61 N. J. L.
228, 39 Atl. 716; I Cooley, Taxation, see. 74. By analogy it would seem that the
wide discretion left to the executive officials in the instant case to decide not only
the necessity for the appropriation but also the amount thereof, is more of a legis-
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lative than an administrative function. Many state constitutions require that the
legislative appropriation be specific as to amount and purpose. See Ill. Const. art.
5, sec. I6; N. D. Const. art. 2, sec. 62; Calif. Const. art. 4, sec. 22.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PowER OF SENATE TO ORDER THE APPEARANCE OF A
WITNESs.-The United States Senate by resolution authorized a committee 
to
investigate the failure of the Attorney General to prosecute those implicated in
the Teapot Dome oil leases, and to investigate any activities of the Attorney
General and his assistants which might tend to impair their efficiency as represen-
tatives of the government. It was authorized to send for persons, books, and
papers. The committee ordered the petitioner to testify before it and to bring
bank ledgers and files with him. He refused to comply. The Senate by resolution
then ordered the petitioner arrested and brought before them to testify so that the
committee might "properly execute the functions imposed upon it, and obtain
information necessary as a basis for such legislative and other action as the Senate
may deem necessary and proper." The petitioner applied for a writ of habeas
corpus. Held, that the petitioner be discharged since the Senate was attempting
to exercise a judicial power which the Constitution did not give it; that there was
no legislation in view; and that though the Senate has judicial power to try an
impeachment, its power was limited to the trial and did not extend to cover the
investigation. Ex parte Daugherty (1924, D. Ohio) 299 Fed. 62o.
Power in a legislative body to exercise a judicial function must be expressly
granted or be given by fair implication in the Constitution. McCuiloch v. Mary-
land (18ig, U. S) 4 Wheat. 316; see 2 Willoughby, Constitutional Law (19io)
1263. Thus where the proper exercise of constitutional functions demands, a
power is implied to punish outsiders for contempt. Anderson v. Dunn (i82I,
U. S.) 6 Wheat. 2o4; In re Chapnzn. (1897) 166 U. S. 661, i7 Sup. Ct 677. The
court in the instant case found that there was no legislation in view and that the
clause to that effect in the second resolution was inserted merely in an attempt to
obtain the necessary power. It has been held that the object of a legislative body
must be presumed to be legitimate if it can possibly be so construed. People,
ex rel. McDonald, v. Keeler (I885) 99 N. Y. 463, 2 N. E. 615; cf. Ex parte Cald-
well (I9o5, C. C. N. D. W. Va.) x38 Fed. 487. And that a mere possibility of
legislation is sufficient to support the action. In re Falvey (1858) 7 Wis. 630; see
In re Chapman, supra. A minor state court.has held that a mere assertion in the
resolution is inconclusive. People, ex rel. Sabold, v. Webb (x889, Sup. Ct.
Spec. T.) 5 N. Y. Supp. 855. But in examining state decisions on this subject, it
should be remembered that state legislatures have broader powers in this regard
than has Congress. See 2 Willoughby, op. cit. 1273. The Senate is expressly
granted the power to try an impeachment. U. S. Const. Art. I, sec. 3, cl. 6. But
that power is limited to trial and the power to conduct an investigation such as
this resides in the House. U. S. Const. Art. I, sec. 2, cl. 5. Te Supreme Court's
decision on appeal would seem to depend upon its ideas as to how much power the
Senate should be allowed-whether or not it is expedient to permit such investi-
gations when there is a mere chance of subsequent legislation. It is obvious that
the individual should not be subject to prying investigations, instituted upon any
grounds whatsoever. See Kilbourn v. Thompson (I88O) io3 U. S. 168; In re
Pacific Ry. Commission (1887, C. C. N. D. Calif.) 32 Fed. 4i. *In general, see
Loring, Powers of Congressional Investigating' Committees (1924) 8 MINN. L.
REV. 595; NOTE (1924) i9 ILL. L. REv. 44; NOTES (1924) 73 U. PA. L. REv. 6o.
CONTRACTS-AcTION FOR RESTITUTION ON REPUDIATION OR BREAcH OF CON-
TRAr-NoTIcE OF REScIsSION.-The defendants contracted with the plaintiffs to
transmit by cable a sum of money to Russia. They failed to perform, and the
plaintiffs, after a delay of six years, demanded their money back. The defendants
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refused to refund the money on the grounds that the plaintiffs, by failing to make
demand within a reasonable time, had waived their right to restitution. Held, that
the plaintiffs should recover. Bank of United States v. National City Bank of
New York (1924, N. Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 123 Misc. 8oi.
On the repudiation or vital breach of a contract an action for restitution may
be maintained as an alternative remedy to an action for damages. St. Helens
Quarry Co. v. Crowe & Co. (i918) go Or. 284, 176 Pac. 427; Anson, Contracts
(Corbin's ed. igig) see. 402; 3 Williston, Contracts (Ig"o) sec. 1455 et seq.
And it may be brought at any time until barred by the Statute of Limitations,
without previous notice of "rescission" or abandonment by the plaintiff. Ripley v.
Hazelton (187o, N. Y. C. P.) 3 Daly, 329; Richter v. Union Land & Stock Co.
(i9oo) 129 Calif. 367, 62 Pac. 39; Woodward, Quasi-Contracts (1913) sec. 267;
3 Williston, op. cit. sec. .469. For a criticism of the use of the word "rescission"
in this connection see Woodward, op. cit. sec. 26G; Anson, op. cit. 44o, note 2, 465,
note I.
EQTgui-ALENATION SuiT-JuRisDIcrIoN OF COURT WHERE NO "PROPERTY
RIGHTS" INvoLvED.-The plaintiff asked for an injunction restraining the defendant
from associating with the plaintiff's husband, claiming that the defendant's insol-
vency rendered the remedy at law inadequate. The Court of Appeals affirmed a
decree granting the injunction. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the injunction
be dissolved. Snedaker v. King (1924, Ohio) 145 N. E. 15.
The statement is often made that the jurisdiction of a court of equity is con-
fined to the protection of "property rights" only and does not extend to the pro-
tection of purely personal rights. Brandeth v. Lance (1839, N. Y.) 8 Paige, 24;
Chappel v. Stewart (1896) 82 Md. 323, 33 Atl. 54z; see Gee v. Pritchard (1&8,
Ch.) 2 Swanst *403. The modem tendency has been to construe the rule very
liberally. The courts when they have exercised jurisdiction have seemingly based
their decisions on the ground that in the specific case the plaintiff had a sufficient
"property interest." Gee v. Pritchard, supra; Vanderbilt v. Mitchell (igo7)
72 N. J. Eq. 927, 67 At. io3. But relief has actually been granted where clearly
no "property right" was involved. Ex Parte Warfield (1899) 40 Tex. Cr. 413, 50
S. W. 933; see Hall v. Smith (1913, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 8o Misc. 85, 14o N. Y.
Supp. 796; Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personalty
(i916) 29 HLv. L. REv. 64o: Long. Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal
Rights (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 115. The utility of attempting to control
domestic affairs in the manner asked by the defendant in the instant case may
well be questioned. In exercising jurisdiction in such cases, the ability of the
court to carry its decree into effect should be one of the controlling factors.
EVIDENE-DYING DECLARATION NOT ADMISSIBLE WHEN MADE BY VIcm=,
OTHER THAN ONE FOR WHOSE DEATH DEFENDANT Is TRuED.-In a prosecution for
murder the trial court admitted in evidence the dying declaration of a decedent,
who was shot by the defendant at the same time as the person for whose homicide
the defendant was on trial. Held, that the evidence should not have been admitted.
Commonwealth v. Stallone (1924, Pa.) 126 Atl. 56.
The dying declaration is admitted in evidence from the two-fold considerations
of necessity of not allowing the murder to go unpunished, and the assurance of
trustworthiness from the solemnity of the occasion. State v. Terrell (859, S. C.)
12 Rich. 321, 329; see Larremore, Dying Declarations (907) 41 Am. L. Rsv. 66o,
666; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 1431. But many limitations have
been imposed on the competency of such evidence. Wigmore, op- cit. secs. L432-
1445. Amongst the limitations is the requirement that the deceased declarant be the
person for whose death the defendant is being tried. Allsup v. State (i9x6) IS
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Ala. App. II, 72 So. 599; State v. Holland (1916) 126 Ark. 332, 190 S. W. 104;
Wigmore, op. cit. sec. 1433. A few courts have taken the opposite view, where
the declarint was killed by the same act which caused the death under investigation.
State v. Terrell, supra (drank of same poisoned whiskey) ; King v. Baker (1837)
2 Moo. & Rob. 53 (partook of same poisoned cake) ; State v. Wilson (1871) 23
La. Ann. 558 (decl~arant wounded at approximately same time or from same
bullet). The limitations on dying declarations have been criticized as an unreason-
able exclusion of evidence equally as safe for the jury to handle as other excepted
hearsay statements. Wigmore, op. cit. 1436; I Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed.
1899) 246, note 6. And the tendency of some courts is rightly towards greater
liberality in their admission. Thurston v. Fritz (1914) 91 Kan. 468, 138 Pac. 625;
see People v. Borella (1924, Ill.) 143 N. E. 471. But the court, in the instant case,
expressed itself as "satisfied to hold to the doctrine of the weight of decisions as
stated in Railing v. Commonwealth (i885) Iio Pa. ioo, I Atl. 314, without entering
into a discussion of the reasons for the rule."
INTERNATIONAL LAW-FOREIGN ENVOY To THIRD STATE IMMUNE FROM SERVICE
OF PRocEss.--The defendant was a diplomatic attach6 of Panama to its legation
in Italy. While passing through New York he was arrested and served with a
summons in an action for divorce. He moved to vacate the order of arrest and
the service of summons. Held, that the motion to vacate the order of arrest be
granted, but that the motion to vacate the service of summons be denied. Carbone
v. Carbone (1924, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 123 Misc. 656, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 40.
While it is generally agreed that a foreign representative travelling in a third
state is free from arrest, there is some difference of opinion as to his freedom
from service of process. Holbrook v. Henderson (1851, N. Y. Super.) 4 Sandf.
61g; Wilson v. Blanco (1889) 56 N. Y. Super. Ct. 582; 4 Moore, Internat. Law
Digest (19o6) sec. 643; I Oppenheim, Internat. Law (3d ed. 1920) 574; Lawrence,
Principles of Internat. Law (7th ed. 1923) 289. If an unnecessary impediment is
thrown in the way of free passage, the right of embassy of the sovereign is
impaired. Holbrook v. Henderson, supra, at p. 633. Service of process on the
defendant in the instant case was not such an impediment as to interfere with his
diplomatic functions. He could appear by attorney and personally be free to go
about his sovereign's business. See generally I Sartow, Diplomatic Practice (2d
ed. 1922) 329 et seq.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-UNRECOGNIZE.D DE FACTO GOVERNMENTs-ExTRA-TERRI-
TORIAL EFFEcT OF ITS DEctEES ON INTERNAL MATTERs.-The plaintiff was the
assignee of a claim against the defendant, a Russian corporation dissolved by
decree of the Soviet Government. Held, that the complaint will not be dismissed
on the ground that the defendant no longer exists, since the court would thus be
indirectly recognizing the existence of the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic.
James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co. (1924, ist Dept.) 21o App. Div. 82, 205
N. Y. Supp. 472.
Recognition is necessary to assure a political organism an independent status in
international political intercourse. I Moore, Digest of International Law (19o6)
72. When this status is involved in litigation, the court must be guided by the
political department of the forum. Foster v. Neilson (1829, U. S.) 2 Pet. 253,
3o7. But a faction may actually exist and exercise internal sovereignty 
though
nations refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with it; it is then called 
a de facto
government, local or general. Thorington v. Smith (1868, U. S.) 8 Walk 
I;
COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 534; Dickinson, The 
Unrecognized
Government or State in English and American Law (1923) 22 MicH. L. 
REv. 29.
Its existence as a de facto government acting as such is the operative fact 
by
reason of which foreign courts will not examine or pass upon the legality 
of its
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actions. This is a political question. Its existence gives it the power and the
privilege to collect duties and taxes. United States v. Rice (i8ig, U. S.) 4 Wheat.
246; MacLeod v. United States (1913) 229 U. S. 416, 33 Sup. Ct 955; Bluefields
Case (1899) I Moore, supra 49. Or to give a title to property which will be
"recognized" elsewhere. The Helena (18ox, Adrm.) 4 C. Rob. 3; Oetien v. Central
Leather Co. (I918) 246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309; Underhill v. Hernandez (1895,
C. C. A. 2d) 65 Fed. 577, aff'd (1897) 168 U. S. 250, i8 Sup. Ct 83 (subsequent
recognition of the de facto government was really immaterial). And foreign
courts will not exercise jurisdiction over it for acts of confiscation within its
own territory. Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Soviet Republic (1923) 234 N. Y.
372, 138 N. E. 24. But the laws of a foreign government, recognized or unrecog-
nized, will not be "enforced" in the courts of the forum if contrary to public
policy. There is no public policy, however, in our country disabling a state from
dissolving its domestic corporations; and such dissolutions have resulted in their
being treated as defunct in every other state. 8 Fletcher, Corporations (gig)
9702. But it cannot dissolve foreign corporations. Sokoloff v. National City
Bank, N. Y. Ct. of Appeals (Nov. 25, 1924). The issue before our courts in such
matters would seem to be the existence of the de facto government and the effect
of its laws where it exists. See Sokoloff v. National City Bank (1922, Sup. Ct.
Spec. T.) 120 Misc. 252, 19o N. Y. Supp. 355; NyOFs (923) 71 U. PA. L. Rlv.
270. Recognition of a government has no "retroactive" or other effect except as
evidence of its existence. In the instant case, the existence of the Soviet Govern-
ment is conceded. Wulfsohn v. Russian Soviet supra. It would seem, therefore,
that the question before the court is whether the Russian law did dissolve the
defendant corporation. See Sea Ins. Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co. (1923, K. B.) 17
Lloyd's List 316; (August 2, 1924) 5 Russian Information & Review no. 5. A
recent dictum that political recognition is material seems erroneous. Joint Stock
Co. v. National City Bank, (Dec. 1o, 1924) N. Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. Oct. Term
1924, no. 130.
MuNiciPAL CoRPoRATIoNs-TAXATIoN-PowER TO EXEMPT A RAILRoAD.-In
1855, the defendant municipality granted to the plaintiff's predecessor the exclusive
use of certain lands for railroad purposes, free from all taxes and assessments, in
consideration for a conveyance to it of riparian lands owned by the predecessor.
In 1865, a town ordinance affirmed the contract as to the plaintiff. In 1894, the
plaintiff obtained a temporary injunction against the collection of taxes for that
year by the defendant, which was renewed in 1895. In 1923, these injunctions were
made permanent. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the decree be reversed. City
of Parkersburg v. Baltimore & 0. Ry. (1923, C. C. A. 4th) 296 Fed. 74.
A grant to a municipality of power to tax does not authorize exemption from
taxation. Unless authorized in its charter to do so, an exemption grant is ultra
vires and void. 5 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (1913) 5011; 2 Cooley,
Taxation (4th ed. 1924) 1398. This rule strikes at effecting a restraint upon so
important a power as that of taxation; at permitting the grantee to escape a
common burden; at the possibilities of corruption incident to leaving the taxing
power within the bargaining power of municipal officials. To throw the risk of the
existence of this power upon the claimant of the privilege does not seem unfair
in the light of the public nature of charter powers and the foregoing matters of
policy. Nor should the fact that consideration was paid by the claimant be
material. Tarer v. Dalton (191o) 134 Ga. 462, 67 S. E. 929; Richmond v. Va.
Ry. & Power Co. (1919) 124 Va. 529, 98 S. E. 691. And the city has the power
to tax without being liable for a breach of contract. Turner Investment Co. v.
Seattle (912) 70 Wash. 2O, 126 Pac. 426., Where practicable, the consideration
received by the city may be required to be returned. Walker v. Richmond (1916)
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173 Ky. 26, I89 S. W. 1122. Where services have been rendered to the city in
exchange for the exemption agreement, the courts,'struck by the apparent injus-
tice, uphold the exemption. Maine Water Co. v,. W'aterville (ipoo) 93 Me. 586,
45 AU. 836; Portland Water Co. v. Portland (1922, Conn.) x18 At1. 84; 3 Dillon,
Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) 2173; (compare part performance under
the Statute of Frauds). However unfortunate it may appear to the claimant of
the exemption in a particular case, it is inconsistent to forbid exemptions and
yet uphold a contract to exempt. See Edwards v. Jackson (9io) 96 Miss. 547,
5I So. 802. Or to allow the running of the Statute of Limitations to give the
exemption validity. But see (924) 38 HARV. L. Rmv. i2. Nor does it seem
sound to distinguish and enforce an agreement to pay back the taxes assessed as
a "compensation" or "commutation." Washington Power Co. v. Spokane (1916)
89 Wash. i49, 154 Pac. 329; Hampton Co. v. Hampton (914) 77 N. H. 373, 92
AUt. 549. Besides, most courts agree that the power to "commute" exists only
where there is a power to exempt. Dayton v. Bellevue Water & Fuel Co. (i9o2)
i9 Ky. 714, 68 S. W. i42; New Orleans v. New Orleans Sugar Co. (1883) 35
La. Ann. 548. It is probably less socially desirable for railroads and other enter-
prises to locate because of tax exemptions, than because of other rules of engineer.
ing and business economy. See Goodnow, The Nature of Tax Exemptions (1913)
13 CoL. L. Rxv. IO4: Harriman. State Suicide and Tax Exemptions (i9.2) i6
ILL. L. REV. 575.
NEGLIGENcE-DuTY OF LANDOWNE To REscuER oF BusiNEss VlsiToL-A jani-
tress of premises owned by the defendant fell through a secret trap door in the
floor. The plaintiffs,' husband and wife, sue for injuries to the wife resulting.
from falling through the same trap door in rushing to answer the janitress' cries
for help. From judgments dismissing the complaints, the plaintiffs appeal. Held,
(two judges dissenting) that the judgments be reversed. Laufer v. Shapiro (1924,
ist Dept.) 2o6 N. Y. Supp. i89.
A landowner is responsible in damages to a servant for injuries resulting from
a failure to keep his premises safe or to warn of concealed dangers. Falardeau v.
Hoar (I9O6) 192 Mass. 263, 78 N. E. 456; Day v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods
Co. (9o5) 114 Mo. App. 479, 89 S. W. 903; 3 Labatt, Master and Servant (1913)
sec. 979, note 3. See Fleckenstein v. Great A. & P. Tea Co. (1917) 9I N. J. L.
145, IO2 Atl. 700; (1918) 16 MIcH. L. REv. 458; (i924) 33 YA. LAW JOURNAL,
662. And also to one rushing to rescue a party endangered by a breach of such
,duty. Gibney v. State (1893) 137 N. Y. 1,33 N. E. i42. But only where the act
of rescue "whether impulsive or deliberate is the child of the occasion." Wagner
v. International Ry. Co. (1921) 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437. This is a question
of fact in each case. But see Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner toward Those
Entering His Premises of Their Own Right (i92i) 69 U. PA. L. REv. x42,
237, 340.
PLEADING---COUNTERCLAIM FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY IN ACTION OF RE'LEVIN.-
Upon default of payment for an automobile purchased on a conditional sale, the
vendor brought an action of replevin to recover possession. The defendant
counterclaimed for breach of warranty and fraud. A motion to strike the counter-
claim as improper in the action of replevin was overruled by the lower 
court.
Held, (two judges dissenting) ihat the judgment be reversed. McCargar v. Wiley
(1924, Or.) 229 Pac. 665.
Some states still refuse to allow a counterclaim in an action to recover specific
chattels. Sylvester v. Ammons ('1904) 126 Iowa, 141, 101 N. W. 782 (expressly
prohibited by statute) ; General Motors Co. v. Phila. Paving Co. 
(1915) 248 Pa.
499, 94 AUt. 235; Pomeroy, Code Remedies (i9o4, 4th ed.) see. *767. 
Other states,
under the counterclaim provisions of their codes, limit it to matters 
of defense
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which deny the plaintiff's right to possession. Baldwin v. Burrows (1883) 95 Ind.
81; Dearing Water Co. v. Thompson (I9o9) 156 Micl. 365, 120 N. W. 8oi; see
(916) 16 CoL. L. REv. 358. The basis of this limitation is the theory that a
counterclaim must "defeat or diminish the plaintiff's recovery." Pomeroy, supra,
sec. *744, *745, *767; Spaus v. Stolwein (911, Sup. Ct.) 75 Misc. I, 134 N .Y.
Supp. 603; see N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 266. It is contrary to the time-saving
practice of settling all controversies between the parties which may be conveniently
tried at the same time. McCormick Harvesting Co. v. Hill (i9o4) T04 Mo. App.
544, 79 S. W. 745; Titan Truck Co. v. Richardson (1922) I22 Wash. 452, 2IO Pac.
790; see COMMENTS (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 862. If the damages in the
instant case equalled or exceeded the debt due, the allowance of the counterclaim
might be justified to the extent of defeating the plaintiff's claim under even the
stricter view. Ames v. Rea (1892) 56 Ark. 450, 19 S. W. io63; Zimmerman v.
Sunset Lumber Co. (19io) 57 Or. 309, III Pac. 690.
RES JUDICATA-EFFECT OF PRIOR JUDGMENT IN DEATH ACTION BiY PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE UPON RIGHTS OF UNBORN CHILD.-For wrongfiil death a statute
granted to the heirs or personal representative of the deceased, for the benefit of
the heirs, a right of action against the person causing the death. Utah Comp.
Laws, 1917, secs. 6504, 65o5. The plaintiff brought an action under the statute
against the defendant company to recover damages for the death of his father.
Prior to this suit and before the birth of the plaintiff, damages had been recovered
from the defendant by the widow, as personal representative, for her benefit and
that of the three children then living. The lower court denied recovery on the
ground that the plaintiff was an heir within the meaning of the statute. Held,
that the judgment be affirmed. Parmley v. Pleasant Valley Co. (1924, Utah) 228
Pac. 557.
The statement is often made that whenever it is for a child's benefit he will be
given the rights he would have had if alive at the time the operative facts
occurred. Doe dem. Clarke (795, C. P.) 2 H. BL 399; Deal v. Sexton (19o7)
144 N. C. 157, 56 S. E. 691; contra: Gorman v. Budlong (i9oI) 23 RL I. i69, 49
Ati. 704; Drobner v. Peters (1921) 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567, reversing (i92I,
.St Dept.) 194 App. Div. 696, 186 N. Y. Supp. 278 (recovery denied in action for
prenatal injury) ; but see (i921) 21 CoT. L. REv. i99. He has been recognized
as a person for the purpose of recovering under death statutes. The George' and
Richard (1871, Adm.) L. R. 3 A. & E. 466; Texas and Pac. Ry. v. Robertson
(189i) 82 Tex. 657, 17 S. W. 1o41. According to the general rule judgments and
decrees are binding only upon those who are parties to the controversy in which
they were rendered. Hanberry v. Doolittle (1865) 38 Ill. 202; Monarque v.
Monarque (i88o) 80 N. Y. 320. But out of necessity the doctrine of representa-
tion grew up as a limitation upon this rule. By that doctrine a party not before
the court in person, if so represented by others that his interests receive efficient
protection, is bound by the decree. Hale v. Hale (1893) 146 Ill. 227, 33 N. E. 858.
In order to have effective representation there must be absence of conflicting
interests between the unborn child and the living representative as against the
defendant. Kent v. Church of St. Michael (1892) 136 N. Y. 10, 32 N. E. 704
(unborn child bound by judgment of partition because interests virtually repre-
sented) ; Ladd v. Weiskopf (1895) 62 Minn. 28, 64 N. W. 99 (decree of probate
court for distribution of estate) ; see Gavin v. Curtin (1898) i71 Ill. 640, 49 N. E.
523 (possible future remainderman bound by sale of realty under court order) ;
Tonnelle v. Wetmore (19o9) 195 N. Y. 436, 88 N. E. io68 (construction of will).
But where the interests of the child are not adequately represented, the decree
will not be binding on him. Downey v. Seib (igo6) I85 N. Y. 427, 78 N. E. 66;
Deal v. Sexton, supra. In the instant case it seems that the interests of the unborn
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child were adequately represented at the prior suit especially as the amount of
recovery is the same regardless of the number of children. But see contra:
Nelson v. Galveston H. & S. A. Ry. 0I89O) 7 9 Tex. 621, 14 S. W. ozi. The
child's remedy would seem to be a suit against his co-heirs for distribution.
SALES-INSPECTION OF GOODS-CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO RECOVERY OF PRICE--
Risx OF DETERIORATION UNDER ORDER BuILS oF LADING.-The seller contracted to
sell rice to the buyer f.o.b. seller's city, and shipped it under a bill of lading to
his own order with directions to allow inspection. Due to delay in transit the
rice did not arrive till a month after shipment The buyer, finding the rice had
become mouldy in transit, refused to accept or pay for it In a suit by the seller,
apparently for the price, the lower court gave judgment for the defendant on the
ground that title did not pass until arrival of the goods at destination and,
apparently, that the risk of deterioration in transit was on the seller. Held, that
the judgment be affirmed. Farmers' Rice Milling Co. v. Standard Rice Co. (1924,
Tex. Civ. App.) 264 S. W. 276.
Unless a contrary intent appears, in a contract for the sale of goods f.o.b.
seller's city, the seller has performed all conditions precedent to recovering the
price when he has delivered to the carrier goods up to the specifications of the
contract and fit to stand the ordinary exigencies of travel. Hoffman v. Gosline
(19o9, C. C. A. 6th) 172 Fed. 113, 96 C. C. A. 318; Sales Act, sec. ig, rule 4 (i),
(2) ; I Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) 584, 602. There is no implied warranty
that the goods will not deteriorate in case of unusual delay in transit, and such
deterioration does not affect the legal relations of the parties. English v. Spokane
Commission Co. (1893, C. C. A. 9th) 57 Fed. 451; Sales Act, sec. 22; 1 Williston,
op. cit., 493, 693, 700. Inspection is addressed primarily to the normal case where
the goods on arrival conform to contract; it has real value in protecting the
buyer from having to pay blindfolded. Skinner v. Griffiths 01914) 8o Wash. 291,
141 Pac. 693; I, 2 WillistQn, op. cit., 587, 1234. So, on the seller's side, a bill of
lading to seller's order has real value as security, even where the draft is met
promptly on presentation. Such a form of bill of lading is not commonly intended,
nor is it by the better authorities construed, to prevent the passing of the beneficial
interest and resultant risks of shipment Alderman v. Westinghouse Co. (i9x8)
92 Conn. 419, 1o3 Atl. 267; Rosenberg v. Buffum Co. (1922) 234 N. Y. 338, 137
N. E. 609; Sales Act, secs. 20 (2), 22 (a) ; I Williston, op. cit., 602, 642, 697,
700; contra: Willman Merc. Co. v. Fussy (1895) 15 Mont 511, 39 Pac. 738. And
a power in the seller to defeat the buyer's rights is not per se inconsistent with
such risk-bearing by the buyer. Sales Act, see. 25. The inspection provision,
inserted to perform for the buyer the same security function as does the seller's
order provision for the seller, should likewise be held not to shift risks. Standard
Casing Co. v. Cal. Casing Co. (1922) 233 N. Y. 413, 135 N. E. 834; 2 Williston,
op. cit., 1234. But some courts have treated it as an indication that the seller's
conditions and duty are not performed unless the goods on such inspection measure
up to the contract Agri Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Fertilizer Co. (1916) 129 Md. 42,
98 At. 365. This is to give the condition of inspection the seemingly unwarranted
effect of shifting the risk of loss or depreciation in transit The court.in the
instant case apparently directed its attention largely to the form of the bill of
lading and the inspection provision, adopting the less desirable interpretation of
each. Such reasoning has been common in similar suits, resulting in clearly
unfortunate decisions. Cragun v. Todd (19o6) 131 Iowa, 250, io8 N. W. 450;
Sanders v. Landreth (1915) 100 S. C. 389, 84 S. E. 88o. That the instant deci-
sion is not under the Sales Act should not affect the result Mirabita v. Imperial
Ottoman Bank (1878, C. A.) L. R. 3 Exch. Div. 164; Hoffman v. Wisconsin
Lumber Co. (1921) 2o7 Mo. App. 44o, 229 S. W. 289; see also Farmers' &
Mechanics' Bank v. Logan (1878) 74 N. Y. 568, 581.
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SALEs-LATENT DEFEcT-LIABHITY OF VENDOR TO A THiRD PERsoN iN WAR-
RANTY.-The defendant, a retailer, sold to the plaintiffs a gas-heater, 
representing
that "it could be used with perfect safety." Unknown to the defendant the heater
was defectively constructed and generated a poisonous gas, causing 
the death of
the plaintiff's infant child. An action was brought under a death damage 
statute
for breach of an express or implied warranty of fitness for the particular 
use.
The statute allowed a recovery if the decedent would have recovered had 
death
not ensued. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained. Held, that 
the judg-
ment be affirmed. State, to use of Bond, v. Consolidated Gas, Electric and 
Power
Co. (1924, Md.) 126 Atl. 165.
Warranties generally "run" only in favor of the immediate purchaser. 
Willis-
ton, Sales (2d ed. 19z4) sec. 244. Any liability in tort is distinct. 
Thus, in the
sale or preparation of an article which negligence may make imminently dangerous,
the vendor owes a duty of care commensurate with the 
nature of the article.
Thomas v. Winchester. (1852) 6 N. Y. 397; MacPherson v. Buick Co. (1916) 217
N. Y. 382, I1 N. E. 1050; see (1916) 25 4XALE LAW JOURNAL, 
679. A vendor
who merely acts as a middleman is under no obligation to discover 
the dangerous
character of the goods he sells, and, except for "active misconduct," 
is not liable
in tort. Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. McMath's Adm'r (1912) 148 
Ky. 265, 146 S. W.
770; Kusick v. Thorndike & Hix (i916) 224 Mass. 413, 112 N. E. 102S; 
Cox V.
Mason (I9O3, 2d Dept.) 89 App. Div. 219, 85 N. Y. Supp. 973 
(liable for negli-
gent repair). By means of an implied warranty which 
"runs" with the goods,
there has been a tendency, in the food cases, to impose liability 
as an insurer on
manufacturer and vendor indiscriminately. Davis v. Van 
Camp Packing Co.
(1920) 189 Iowa, 775, 176 N. W. 382; Sloan v. Woolworth 
Co. (1915) 193 Ill.
App. 620 (canned goods sold by retailer) ; see Perkins, Unwholesome 
Food (1919)
5 IowA L. BuL.. 6, 95; contra: Chysky v. Drake 
(1923) 235 N. Y. 468, 139
N. E. 576. But an "unwholesome can of beans" would seem 
no more imminently
dangerous than a "del .ctive auto wheel." A harmonization 
of the two lines of
cases is to be desired, extending the obligation of the 
manufacturer or person
whose label the goods bear, and limiting that of the mere 
retailer, With no oppor-
tunity of inspection, as in the case of package food. 
The use by the courts, as
against a manufacturer, of res ipsa lo~tuitur, raising an 
inference of negligence
from the mere fact of the defect, tends in this direction. 
Payne v. Rome Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. (1912) 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S. E. 
io87; Pillars v. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. (1918) 117 Miss. 490,.78 So. 365. Where 
such responsibility is
imposed the plaintiff's theory, whether in "tort" or "warranty," 
should not alter
the result and his lack of privity should be no bar 
to an 'action on the "warranty."
See COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 782; cf. 
Gearing v. Berkson
(I916) 223 Mass. 257, 11 N. E. 785. But an "implied 
warranty" against a defect
dangerous to life and limb is to be sharply distinguished 
from an "implied .war-
ranty" of merchantability or a defect in quality resulting 
merely in lessened
exchange or use value, which concerns only the buyer 
and seller. For a valuable
suggestion that an action be allowed a sub-purchaser on 
an "express warranty"
made generally to the public by labels and advertisements, 
see Williston, Sales
(2d ed. 1924) sec. 244a.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANcE-ABATEMENT 
FOR DEFICIENcy DENIEn WHmRE VENDEE
KNEw oF DEFEc.-The plaintiff contracted 
with the defendant for the purchase
of two tracts of land knowing them to be 
part of a trust estate of which the
defendant was the trustee. By the terms of 
the trust, which were unknown to
the plaintiff, the defendant could not 
convey one of these tracts. The plaintiff
petitioned for specific performance with abatement 
for the deficiency. Held, that
this relief should be denied. Hughes v. Hadley 
(1924, N. J. Eq.) 126 AtI. 33.
Where there is a substantial defect in the title 
which the vendor has contracted
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to convey, the vendee, if unaware of the defect at the time of contracting, may
compel the vendor to convey whatever he can with a proportionate abatement for
the deficiency, when such deficiency can be apportioned. Mellin v. Woolley (19o8)
1o3 Minn. 498, 115 N. W. 654; Barthel v. Engle (1914) 261 Mo. 307, 168 S. W.
1154; NOTES (1912) 25 HARV. L. REv. 731; and see 5 Pomeroy, Equity Juris-
prudence (2d ed. 1919) sec. 2256. But abatement will be denied if the vendee at
the time he entered into the contract had knowledge of the defect. Peeler v. Levy
(1875) 26 N. J. Eq. 330; Moore v. Lutieharms (1912) 91 Neb. 548, 136 N. W.
343; NOTrEs (i9o8) 8 COL. L. REv. 309. Or if a reasonable man would have
known of the defect. Thus when the vendee knew the vendor was married, it
is held he should have known of the wife's right to inchoate dower and no abate-
ment is allowed. Castle v. Wilkinson (1870) L. R. 5 Ch. App. 535; Kuratli v.
Jackson (1911) 6o Or. 2o2, 118 Pac. 192; see NOTES AND COMMENT (1924) 9
CORN. L. QUART. 47o; L. R. A. 1917 F, 597, note. Similarly where there are
"open and notorious" physical structures and easements on the premises. Ash-
burner v. Sewell [i89i] 3 Ch. 4o5; Wetherby v. Griswold (915) 75 Or. 468, 147
Pac. 388. And where a third party is in actual possession of the property to be
conveyed. James v. Lichfield (1869) L. R. 9 Eq. 51; Eppstein v. Kuhn (i9o6)
219 Ill. 154, 76 N. E. 145. Also one who contracts with a known trustee is held
to contract with reference to the extent and limitation of that trust, regardless
of his actual knowledge. Synder v. Collier (19o9) 85 Neb. 552, 123 N. W. lO23;
Alexander v. Harris (1923, Tex. Civ. App.) 254 S. W. 146; 2 Devlin, Deeds
(3d ed. 1911) sec. 738a. So the court, in the instant case, seems logical in denying
specific, performance with abatement where the vendee knew that the property
contracted for was subject to a trust
TAXATION-DECREASE IN LIABILITY DUE TO FALL IN THE RATE OF EXCHANGE
NOT TAXABLE AS INCOME.-Before the war, the plaintiff, a domestic corporation,
borrowed money from a German bank repayable in marks. After the United
States entered the war, payment was made to the Alien Property Custodian at the
current rate of exchange. This payment was approximately $684,000 less than
the value of the marks at the time of the loan. The Collector of Internal Revenue
attempted to tax the difference as income. Held, that this sum was a gain accru-
ing to capital and not taxable income: Kerbaugh-Empire Co. v. Bowers (1924,
S. D. N. Y.) 3oo Fed. 938.
Prior to actual severance by a "sale or conversion," a gain accruing to capital
is not "income" taxable within the Sixteenth Amendment. Eisner v. Macomber
(1920) 2.52 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct 189; Mercmnts L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka
(1921) 255 U. S. 509, 41 Sup. Ct 386. Some economists regard appreciation of
capital, susceptible of evaluation in terms of money, as "income" even before a
"sale or conversion." Haig, rhe e d ral i -o0e T-- 1-- e
concept expresses merely the most convenient moment for taxation from an
administrative point of view. Haig, op. cit. I8, i. In the instant case there was
no sale or conversion of capital assets, but there was an accrual of benefit whether
it is called "accrued capital" or "income." The liquidation of the loan is as opera-
tive as a sale or conversion to fix the convenient point for evaluation of the
increment. The only distinction is one of form; in the former, the actual money
is received at the time of the loan and the form of the increment is a decrease in
obligations, while in the latter the money is not received until the sale and the
increment is an increase of assets. Thus, where a corporation issues bonds at par,
and subsequently because of a fall in the market value, is enabled to re-purchase
them at less than par, the difference is taxable income. Income and Profits Tax
Regulations (1922) Reg. 62, art. 545, c. Unpaid debts, written off the books
because of the Statute of Limitations, constitute income in the year written off.
Great Northern Ry. v. Lynch (1921, D. Minn.) Treas. Dec. 3147. Cancellation
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of indebtedness, used by the court in the principal case to illustrate its argument,
is a gift, and not taxable unless given for a valuable consideration. Revenue Act
of 1924, sec. 213 (3) ; Income and Profits Tax Regulations, supra, art. 5o; Holmes,
Federal Taxes (1923 ed.) 545, 668; see dissent of Ward, J. in U. S. v. Oregon,
Washington Co. (I918, C. C. A. 2d) 251 Fed. 211. The decrease in obligations
due to the fall in the rate of exchange was certainly not a gift within the meaning
of the statute but constituted an accrual to capital which at the moment of liquida-
tion became "income" in the legal sense. As such it should be .taxable.
TAXATIoN-STATE FRANCHISE TAX OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS BASED ON ALLO-
CATED INcomE.-The New York Tax Law, Cons. Laws, i9o9, ch. 6o, art ga as
amended by N. Y. Laws, 1917, ch. 726 and N. Y, Laws, 1918, chs. 27z, 276, 417,
imposes an annual franchise tax on foreign corporations, based on the previous
year's income in that state This is found by allocating to the state that propor-
tion of the corporation's total income that its property assets within the state bear
to its entire property assets. It excludes all but ten per cent. of the corporation's
holdings of stock in other corporations from its total assets, but permits the state
to include the income from all of these stocks in the corporation's total income.
The relator, having made no profit in the state during the previous year, paid the
tax under protest and sued for its return in the New York courts where the tax
was declared valid. On appeal to this court he assigned as one ground of error
the unconstitutionality of the provision excluding the stock, which had not been
raised below. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Bass. Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd.
v. State Tax Commission (Nov. 17, 1924) U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct. Term, 1924, no. 1o.
Allocation of a certain proportion of the corporation's entire income to a state
according to its property in the state is a constitutional method of determining a
subject of taxation, since the tax is held to be for the privilege of doing business
within the state and not to be an income tax. Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain (igig) 94 Conn. 47, 1o8 Atl. 154, aff'd (1920) 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup.
Ct. 45; People, ex rel. Alpha P. C. Co. v. Knapp (1920) 23o N. Y. 48, 129 N. E.
2o2; see NoTEs (1920) 20 CoL. L. REV. 324; and COMMENTS (1921) 3O YALE
LAw JOURNAL, 512. The provision excluding stock from the corpbration's total
assets in computing the allocated income was declared unconstitutional by the New
York Court of Appeals. People, ex rel. Alpha P. C. Co. v. Knapp, supra. But
this question has never been properly presented ior review before the United States
Supreme Court. See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Commission (Nov. 17, 1924)
U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct. Term, x924, no. 5.
TORTs-TESTS OF THE JOINT TORT RELATIONSHIP.-The plaintiff's ship A, the
defendant ship B, and a third ship C were in convoy. As a result of independent
acts of negligent navigation, a collision occurred between B and C, as a direct
consequence of whjch A was sunk. A judgment for full damages was recovered
against C, but later limited under an admiralty statute. Plaintiff then libeled B,
and was met by a plea of judgment against its joint tort-feasor C as a bar. The
lower court denied the existence of a joint tort and found for the plaintiff. Held,
that the judgment be affirmed. The Koursk (1924, C. A.) 40 T. L. R. 399.
In applying the diverse rules premised upon the existence of the joint tort-feasor
status, a practical difficulty has arisen in determining what constitutes that legal
relationship. (1924) 36 JuRm. REv. 178. In considering the definitions, cases of
mere joinder of parties under the Codes, for procedural expediency, should be
excluded. Such cases are not concerned with the substantive relations of the
parties. Sherlock v. Manwaren (1924, 4th Dept.) 2o8 App. Div. 538, 203 N. Y.
Supp. 709; (1924) 33 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 328. Four affirmative tests then
appear. The first requires that the causes of action against each defendant be the
same. Pollock, Torts (ilth ed. z92o) 193; King v. Hoare (1844, Exch.) I3
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M. & W. 493, 5o4. The solution would then depend upon a definition of "cause
of action" which is itself a term of indefinite content Clark, The Code Causes
of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 817, The second demands a single
injuria, or wrongful act, and a single harm, or dainnum--likewise terms of indefi-
nite content Sadler v. G. W. Ry. [1896, H. L.] A. C. 45o. The third, approved
in the instant case, limits the test to "concerted action toward a common end."
Clerk and Lindsell, Torts (7th ed. 1921) 59, et seq.; Dickson v. Yates (1922) 194
Iowa, 9IO, I88 N. W. 948. But the last test finds a joint tort relation among all
those whose acts directly cause a given injury. Farley v. Crystal Coke Co. (1920)
85 W. Va. 595, 1O2 S. E. 265; Tobin v. Seattle (1923) 127 WashL 664, 221 Pac.
583. Applying the first three tests, the English cases have held, as in the instant
case, that separate negligent acts, although concurring to create one injury, do not
constitute a joint tort. Sadler v. G. W. Ry., supra; Thompson v. London County
Council [i899, C, A.] I Q. B. 840. But the American decisions seem to find such
a relation under the theory of the fourth test. Farley v. Crystal Coke Co., supra;
Pac. Tel. &' Tel. Co. v. Parmenter (igo, C. C. A. 9th) 17o Fed. I4o; contra:
Little Schuylkill Co. v. Richards' Adm'r (1868) 57 Pa. 142; 9 A. L. R. 933, 940,
note. It may well be that the English courts are influenced by the rule that a judg-
ment secured against one joint tort-feasor bars suit against all others. Brinsmead
v. Harrison (1871) L. R. 6 C. P. 584. And since the majority American rule on
this point raises no bar until satisfaction, the American cases are more liberal in
finding the joint tort relation. Litchfield v. Goodnow's Adm'r. (1887) 123 U. S.
549, 8 Sup. Ct. 21o. Thus the practical result of the cases is approximately the
same in each country.
WLLs-NON DIsPosiTivE CLAUSE AFTER SIGNATURE DOES NOT INvALmATE
Wnu.-The plaintiff was residuary legatee in two wills executed by the testatrix.
In the second will, a clause relating to the compensation of executors followed the
signature. As his share would be greater under the earlier will, he sought to over-
throw the second as invalid under the Decedent Estate Law (N. Y. Laws, 19o9, ch.
ig, sec. 21) which requires the signature to be at the end of the will. Held, that the
will be admitted to probate since the contested clause was mere surplusage. In re
McConihe's Estate (1924, Surro. Ct.) 123 Misc. 318, 205 N. Y. Supp. 780.
Though it is fatal to a will to have a dispositive clause after the signature,
under such statutes the general rule regarding surplusage agrees with the principal
case. Ward v. Putnam (i9o5) 19 Ky. 889, 85 S. W. 179; 2 Ann. Cas. 730, note.
In the absence of statutes the signature need not be at the end. Armstrong v.
Walton (I913) I05 Miss. 337, 62 So. 173; Ann. Cas. 1916 E, I4O, note. For 
a
general discussion of the subject see i Schouler, Wills (6th ed. 1923) sec. 487.
WL.Ls-UNDUE INFLUENCE NOT PRESUMED FROM ExisTENcE OF MERETRICIOUS
RELATIONS.-The deceased attempted to leave all of his property to the proponent,
with whom he was having illicit relations at the time of executing the alleged will.
Contestant urged this relation alone raised a presumption of undue influence.
From the lower court's decree refusing probate, proponent appealed. Held, that
the decree be reversed. In re Gaddes' Will (1924, N. J.) 126 AtI. 287.
The instant case merely adds another decision to the apparently well settled
dbctrine that the existence of illicit relations is not ground for a presumption of
undue influence. Middleton's Case (i9o5) 68 N. J. Eq. 798, 64 AUt. 1134; 1
Underhill, Law of Wills (1900) sec. 15o; i Woerner, American Law of Adnin-
istration (3d ed. 1923) 63; see Griffith v. Benzinger (1924) 144 Md. 575, 587, 125
Atl. 512, 517. Other evidence must be introduced to show the actual exercise of
improper influence in the procuring of a favorable will. In re Black's Estate
(9o) 132 Calif. 392, 64 Pac. 695; Borland, Wills and Administration of Estates
(19o7) sec. 49; 1 Woerner, op. cit. 6o; cf. Gibony v. Foster (191o) 23o Mo. xo6,
130 S. W, 314.
